Complications of the Afghan endgame

Courtesy:- Dr. Maieeha Lodhi

Not surprisingly the Afghan endgame has become infinitely more complicated. Recent developments in Afghanistan have renewed doubts about the viability of America’s exit strategy. This rests principally on the Afghan forces assuming full security responsibility by 2014, when all Nato combat troops are to leave the country.

Growing animosity between Afghan security personnel and their Nato counterparts erupted in a wave of violent incidents last month, calling into question a key assumption underpinning the 2014 transition. This has created an even more compelling rationale to intensify the search for a political solution – the most plausible plank for a tidy exit of Western forces. Progress towards a negotiated settlement is the only feasible way to wind down the war and achieve the 2014 deadline.

The path to a meaningful peace process is strewn with formidable difficulties. But they must be overcome with greater urgency because the ground realities in Afghanistan are dangerously out of sync with the 2014 timeline. Washington’s decisions ahead of a landmark Nato summit this May in Chicago will determine whether the US-led coalition can draw up a credible strategy to accomplish the 2014 transition. This will also determine whether sufficient Afghan stability can be assured to avert the country’s descent into a 1990s-type civil war once foreign forces begin to depart.

The speed with which security unravelled across Afghanistan in February exposed the volatility of the situation. Fierce protests broke out after American soldiers burnt copies of the Holy Quran at Bagram base. The violent backlash led to the killings of two US military officers at the Interior Ministry. They were among six American soldiers shot dead by Afghan security personnel during angry protests that lasted for weeks. This prompted the recall of hundreds of coalition personnel from many ministries in Kabul.

Long simmering tensions between the Afghan security forces and their foreign mentors boiled over to mark a psychological watershed in the Afghan war. The widespread public outcry reflected pent up resentment against the foreign military presence.

This wasn’t the first episode of its kind. Such incidents have become more frequent in which Afghan soldiers have attacked American or Nato personnel. Earlier this year four French soldiers were shot dead by an Afghan soldier, urging Paris to speed up its troop pullout.

That Afghan forces expected to take over security have turned their guns on their foreign counterparts exposes the unfeasibility of a key element of the much vaunted 2014 transition: collaboration between Afghan and Nato military personnel.

To longstanding doubts about the professional competence and representative character of Afghan security forces have been added more questions – about their reliability and discipline when Nato combat troops depart and are replaced by advisors to ‘aid and assist’ Afghan forces.

The latest events are certain to affect decisions about the Afghan army’s size and structure, which are expected to be announced at Chicago. The size (and anticipated reduction) of security forces has been the subject of a review by the US defence department that has been going on for several months. Another consideration will be added to those of cost, sustainability and US budget pressures: the danger of a large, well armed force disintegrating and becoming a ‘ticket to chaos’.

Whatever the final outcome of these decisions, the transition plan that Washington evolves will have to be a practicable strategy that can foster conditions for an orderly drawdown and ensure a degree of sustainable Afghan stability.

Washington sees the strategic partnership agreement being negotiated with Kabul as an important element of this strategy. This is aimed at allowing the US a longer-term military presence comprising Special Forces and advisers with access to several bases in Afghanistan. Protracted negotiations over the past year are now planned to conclude before May. But they have to overcome two main sticking points: President Hamid Karzai’s insistence that the US military halt controversial night raids and hand over all detention centres on Afghan soil to his government’s control. Last week’s agreement for the US to transfer the Bagram detention centre is seen as a step towards removing one of those obstacles.

But even if the partnership accord is concluded ahead of the Chicago summit, it will likely enmesh the endgame into more complication. Almost all regional states are opposed to an open-ended American military presence in Afghanistan. As for the nascent peace process with the Taliban, it is hard to see how its leaders will agree to a residual US force staying beyond 2014 when the insurgency has been motivated by the desire to rid the country of occupation troops. If this agreement becomes a deal-breaker with the Taliban and unravels a fragile regional consensus where will this leave the transition plan?

The best – and only – hope for the transition plan to work lies in a negotiated end to the Afghan war and in significant headway being made towards this aim before 2014. Diplomatic efforts have however proceeded slowly and haltingly. So far they have involved direct US diplomatic contacts with Taliban representatives aimed at opening a Taliban office in Qatar to put in place a full-fledged peace process.

The talks have progressed slowly first, because of President Karzai’s initial opposition to the Qatar process. This led to a loss of initial momentum. After he was persuaded to change his mind the talks have struggled to regain momentum for other reasons. Legal intricacies and election year politics have constrained Washington’s ability to respond expeditiously to the Taliban’s insistence on the prior transfer of five prisoners from Guantanamo to Doha before formal negotiations can begin. In return the US expects a Taliban announcement renouncing ‘international terrorism’.

Latest indications suggest that a package of confidence building measures including Taliban support for a political process with ‘other Afghans’ now awaits assent from its leadership. If this is forthcoming, the Obama administration believes it will be able to overcome the present opposition in Congress to the prisoners’ transfer. It hopes that the widespread public weariness with the war will be able to trump criticism by Republican Party leaders. Significantly the Taliban did not break off talks with American officials during protests over the burning episode.

If these expectations materialize, an announcement of the launch of formal peace talks could be made at Chicago, where the endorsement of Nato nations will also be sought. This is deemed essential because military operations will eventually be the subject of peace negotiations. As will matters of cease-fires and reduction of violence by both sides.

The pace of the Afghan reconciliation effort will need to quicken if the aim is to align this with the transition that is just two years away. This will also require closer cooperation between Kabul and Islamabad. Some headway has been made in this regard following President Karzai’s February visit to Islamabad. In carefully choreographed statements Karzai urged Pakistan to help in the reconciliation process. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani responded by publicly calling on all Afghans to join the peace effort. Normalization of the uneasy relationship between Pakistan and the US will also be necessary to accelerate the peace process.

Many pieces have to come together for the Afghan reconciliation process to build serious momentum. While American officials acknowledge that “reconciliation is the most important pillar” of its effort towards the transition, the Obama administration still needs to reconcile internally divergent views on talking to the Taliban, bring its military on board and align Nato’s military activities with this political goal.

Coming months will show whether the complexities of the Afghan endgame can be carefully navigated to make progress in securing a negotiated end to the war that has dragged on for so long.