Decapitation strategy
Courtesy:- Dr S. Afsos
There are unconfirmed reports that Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, has been killed in a Predator strike. This is not the first time that he is reported killed, and later on the euphoria evaporated when he popped up alive. What if he is killed? Will his death be a death blow to the militant organization TTP? How will the TTP transform in the aftermath of his death? Let us analyse how a militant organization is affected if its leader is killed or captured.
We can use the Max Boot test for our analysis. According to Max Boot, there are two important factors that determine the future of a militant organisation when its leader is killed or captured. The first is the cult of personality and the second is the control of territory. Terrorist organisations that are built around the cult of personality generally crumble when their leader is killed or captured. Shining Path of Peru and the Kurdish PKK were two organisations that were structured on the personality cult. When Abimael Guzman was arrested in 1992, Shining Path crumbled for all practical purposes. Likewise, PKK ran out of steam when the Turkish authorities apprehended Abdullah Ocalan in 1999.
However, other organisations do not simply disappear after the decapitation of their leadership. The best examples are Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel eliminated Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and his successor Abdul Aziz Rantisi in heli-strikes in 1992. Likewise, Hezbollah’s top brass Imad Mughniyeh and Abbas Mussawi was targeted on different occasions. In both cases, the organisations survived and are still kicking. Here comes the second factor: the control of territory. Hamas survived because it controls Gaza Strip and Hezbollah survived because it dominates south Lebanon. Hence, decapitation has little effect on militant organisations that hold substantial territory.
In the case of the Pakistani Taliban, decapitation of leadership has little effect unlike that of Shining Path and PKK. In 2004, when Nek Mohammad was killed in a missile strike, it had minimum effect on the nascent Taliban infrastructure at that time. Rather the local Taliban consolidated themselves and formed an umbrella network of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2007. In 2009, TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed but the militant organisation survived. Again, the Pakistanii Taliban gained maximum territorial expansion after Baitullah’s death. The reason for its survival is that the structure of the Pakistani Taliban is not developed on a personality cult. Rather, it functions under the Pashtuns’ egalitarian model where the leader is just ‘first among equals’. Therefore, elimination of the leader does not lead to the termination of the militant group because someone from among the ‘equals’ rises up to fill the gap. Today, if Hakeemullah is killed, Abdul Wali aka Umar Khalid of the Mohmand Taliban, Maulvi Faqeer of the Bajaur Taliban, Wali ur Rahman of the Mehsud Taliban, Maulvi Fazlullah of the Swat Taliban or Maulvi Noor Jamal aka Mullah Toofan of the Kurrum-Orakzai Taliban may become the nominal head of the decentralized organisation.
The second important factor that helps in the survival of the Pakistani militants is that they occupy swathes of those territories where the writ of the state is weak. However, when military operations are carried out and the territories from which the militants operate are retrieved, there is relative reduction of militancy not only in the retrieved areas but in the rest of Pakistan also. In such ‘territory-retrieving’ operations, the success of the government and weakening of the militants is in turn dependent on two factors: displacement sanctuaries and strength of the Pakistani state. When the Pakistani military retrieved the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan, the Mehsud as well as their affiliated foreign militants were displaced to the sanctuaries of North Waziristan, Orakazi and Kurrum Agencies. Likewise, after the military operation in Malakand division the Swat Taliban were displaced to new sanctuaries in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces. However, the effects of military operations have shown better results in Swat than in South Waziristan. This is because the writ of the state was stronger in PATA (Swat) than FATA (Waziristan). Likewise, any future operation for example in North Waziristan will be dependent on displacement sanctuaries in Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan and the baseline writ of the Pakistani state.
Therefore decapitation of leadership is less successful in the horizontally networked structure of the Taliban. However, it is more effective when combined with retrieval of territories from which the militants operate. This again is dependent on the baseline strength of the state and displacement sanctuaries to which the militants retreat under pressure.
There are unconfirmed reports that Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, has been killed in a Predator strike. This is not the first time that he is reported killed, and later on the euphoria evaporated when he popped up alive. What if he is killed? Will his death be a death blow to the militant organization TTP? How will the TTP transform in the aftermath of his death? Let us analyse how a militant organization is affected if its leader is killed or captured.
We can use the Max Boot test for our analysis. According to Max Boot, there are two important factors that determine the future of a militant organisation when its leader is killed or captured. The first is the cult of personality and the second is the control of territory. Terrorist organisations that are built around the cult of personality generally crumble when their leader is killed or captured. Shining Path of Peru and the Kurdish PKK were two organisations that were structured on the personality cult. When Abimael Guzman was arrested in 1992, Shining Path crumbled for all practical purposes. Likewise, PKK ran out of steam when the Turkish authorities apprehended Abdullah Ocalan in 1999.
However, other organisations do not simply disappear after the decapitation of their leadership. The best examples are Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel eliminated Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and his successor Abdul Aziz Rantisi in heli-strikes in 1992. Likewise, Hezbollah’s top brass Imad Mughniyeh and Abbas Mussawi was targeted on different occasions. In both cases, the organisations survived and are still kicking. Here comes the second factor: the control of territory. Hamas survived because it controls Gaza Strip and Hezbollah survived because it dominates south Lebanon. Hence, decapitation has little effect on militant organisations that hold substantial territory.
In the case of the Pakistani Taliban, decapitation of leadership has little effect unlike that of Shining Path and PKK. In 2004, when Nek Mohammad was killed in a missile strike, it had minimum effect on the nascent Taliban infrastructure at that time. Rather the local Taliban consolidated themselves and formed an umbrella network of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2007. In 2009, TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed but the militant organisation survived. Again, the Pakistanii Taliban gained maximum territorial expansion after Baitullah’s death. The reason for its survival is that the structure of the Pakistani Taliban is not developed on a personality cult. Rather, it functions under the Pashtuns’ egalitarian model where the leader is just ‘first among equals’. Therefore, elimination of the leader does not lead to the termination of the militant group because someone from among the ‘equals’ rises up to fill the gap. Today, if Hakeemullah is killed, Abdul Wali aka Umar Khalid of the Mohmand Taliban, Maulvi Faqeer of the Bajaur Taliban, Wali ur Rahman of the Mehsud Taliban, Maulvi Fazlullah of the Swat Taliban or Maulvi Noor Jamal aka Mullah Toofan of the Kurrum-Orakzai Taliban may become the nominal head of the decentralized organisation.
The second important factor that helps in the survival of the Pakistani militants is that they occupy swathes of those territories where the writ of the state is weak. However, when military operations are carried out and the territories from which the militants operate are retrieved, there is relative reduction of militancy not only in the retrieved areas but in the rest of Pakistan also. In such ‘territory-retrieving’ operations, the success of the government and weakening of the militants is in turn dependent on two factors: displacement sanctuaries and strength of the Pakistani state. When the Pakistani military retrieved the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan, the Mehsud as well as their affiliated foreign militants were displaced to the sanctuaries of North Waziristan, Orakazi and Kurrum Agencies. Likewise, after the military operation in Malakand division the Swat Taliban were displaced to new sanctuaries in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces. However, the effects of military operations have shown better results in Swat than in South Waziristan. This is because the writ of the state was stronger in PATA (Swat) than FATA (Waziristan). Likewise, any future operation for example in North Waziristan will be dependent on displacement sanctuaries in Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan and the baseline writ of the Pakistani state.
Therefore decapitation of leadership is less successful in the horizontally networked structure of the Taliban. However, it is more effective when combined with retrieval of territories from which the militants operate. This again is dependent on the baseline strength of the state and displacement sanctuaries to which the militants retreat under pressure.
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