FMCT – facts and fiction

Courtesy:- Tariq Osman Hyder
 March 28, 2012

Pakistan has been criticised for its stand on the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. It’s time to separate facts from fiction by examining what is being said.

Pakistan has blocked disarmament negotiations in the CD? The FMCT aims at stopping only future production. It remains a non-proliferation measure, not the disarmament fissile material treaty (FMT) addressing existing stockpiles which Pakistan advocates, a step towards nuclear disarmament which the nuclear powers are committed to under the NPT. Pakistan has blocked the FMCT for a couple of years, but between them the USA, UK, France, Russia and India have blocked negotiations for 30 years while they built up their fissile stocks.

Pakistan argues that the other three items on the agenda of the CD, nuclear disarmament, negative security guarantees for non nuclear states and the prevention of an arms race in outer space are ripe for negotiation. The proposed nuclear weapons convention goes much further than the status quo FMCT but the western nuclear powers, their allies and Russia don’t want legal agreements on these core issues or on a FMT.

The US-India deal is consistent with the non-proliferation obligations of America and the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) and has not impacted Pakistan’s security? India admits that without this exception it does not have the uranium reserves or technology to power its ambitious nuclear power programme. The Indian prime minister declared in parliament that no part of India’s strategic programme would be safeguarded.

The deal leaves out of safeguards: eight Indian reactors ideal for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) production; a large 13 breeders reactor programme to produce more WGPu; and the large power reactors spent fuel stockpile calculated in 2010 by the International Panel of Fissile Materials to contain 6.8 tons of plutonium sufficient for 850 nuclear weapons even if of reactor grade plutonium. Probably some 2.8 tons of this overhang is WGPu. The eight unsafeguarded reactors of 2350 MW using 2400 tons of uranium fuel can annually produce 1200 kg of WGPu enough for 240 nuclear weapons.

Uranium fuel now being supplied from abroad will free up India’s limited reserves for weapons purposes. The Australian ambassador in the USA recently said that if India used uranium imports including from Australia to divert its domestic uranium into weapons that would be very upsetting but would nevertheless not alter the direction of the Australian policy.

Realpolitik considerations to build up India as a strategic partner and commercial objectives motivated the USA/NSG exemption driving a horse and carriage through their NPT obligations. Pakistan which has placed all its power reactors under safeguards and pledged to safeguard any future power reactors has been discriminated against placing both its strategic and energy security under threat.

Pakistan has the fastest growing fissile material production programme? As Pakistan was forced to go nuclear to preserve the strategic balance after India’s explosions, it has the smallest production programme, particularly for plutonium required for a credible minimum deterrent. India has now one dedicated reactor of 100MW thermal and its 2350MW electric of unsafeguarded reactors. That comes to a fissile material production capacity of 7350MW thermal. According to western open sources Pakistan has one small 40MW thermal reactor for just over a decade and it is building two more. It would need to build some 182 more to match India and double that to take into account India’s breeder reactors. That is manifestly not taking place.

Pakistan does not want to match India weapon for weapon but deterrence capability is not static and depends on the threat now accentuated by the US India deal, let alone the Missile Defences systems (ABMs) being supported by the USA, Russia and Israel. Pakistan has always advocated since 1998 in its Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) th0e interlocking elements of strategic restraint including the non introduction of ABMs, conventional balance and dispute resolution. The international community has ignored the SRR and the fact that the only counter to ABMs is to increase the number of missiles.

Pakistan is isolated in the CD? The group of 21 supports the demand that all four core issues be given equal treatment. China understands Pakistan’s position and India and Israel, who are already taken care of by America and its allies, prefer Pakistan to do the heavy lifting and take the flak.

Pakistan has other unmet needs than maintaining its credible minimum deterrent? Pakistan has a number of issues it has to tackle just like other nuclear powers modernising their programmes. Pakistan’s problems have been accentuated by the occupation of Afghanistan. Terrorism and extremism have increased, the economy bled and Fata and Balochistan destabilised through Afghanistan. Without security Pakistan won’t have the space to develop in any sphere.

On the one side is nuclear armed India with its aggressive cold start doctrine and exponentially increasing strategic and conventional capabilities supported by its western and Russian allies. On the other side are the Nato forces in Afghanistan, including three nuclear powers, who countenance drone strikes in Pakistan; and recently launched an attack on Pakistani troops on the border. Were Pakistan not a nuclear power the situation would be much worse.

What should Pakistan’s negotiating strategy be in the CD? In my opinion, while continuing to press for the commencement of negotiations towards legal instruments on the three other core issues in the CD, it should lay out the following conditions for fissile material negotiations. First of all normalisation of Pakistan’s relations with the NPT on a de facto basis as done for India, NSG exception and membership, and nuclear parity with India to allow access to safeguarded nuclear technology and to remove existing barriers.

Secondly an FMT which must address existing stockpiles as asymmetries at the regional and global levels will be a factor for strategic instability. Thirdly India’s unsafeguarded power reactors, breeder programme and the plutonium overhang from its power reactors be placed under safeguards. Until then Pakistan has no alternative but to keep its powder dry.