Normalising ties with the US
Courtesy:- Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi
Will ‘they’ let us?
The resolution passed by the joint session of the parliament on April 12 has offered new recommendations for pursuing Pakistan’s relations with the United States. In a week or so, Pakistan will start a dialogue with the US for reviving bilateral relations and resuming the supply of American goods through Pakistan for NATO/US troops based in Afghanistan.
It is not yet clear if the government of Pakistan will be able to deliver its part of the deal for transit of goods mainly because the security situation has changed a lot in and around Pakistan after the passage of the parliamentary resolution. Further, the resolution contains such demands that may not be implemented soon. The US is not expected to concede those demands quickly which will give the opposition parties in Pakistan another opportunity to question the government’s efforts to normalise relations with the US.
Two developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan on April 15 clearly show that the Taliban and its allies are gaining strength, making it difficult for Pakistan to pursue normal interaction with the US. The parliamentary resolution has been overshadowed by the April 15: attack on the prison in Bannu in KP and well-coordinated attacks in Kabul’s high security zone and other places in Afghanistan.
The massive nature of the Afghan Taliban assault show that the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Police, trained and equipped by the US. are unable to ensure security in Afghanistan. The growing power of Afghan Taliban is not a bad sign for Afghanistan’s stability which will have negative fallout on Pakistan’s tribal areas. The Pakistani Taliban (i.e. the TTP) have also demonstrated that despite their decline since 2009-2010 they retain enough capacity to challenge the Pakistani state. These Pakistani and Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani allied groups can threaten the transit route for American goods.
The parliamentary resolution does not say anything significant about Pakistan’s problems with Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups based in the tribal areas or mainland Pakistan. Almost all supporters of Islamic parties and militant groups as well as the activists of the PML(N) and PTI complain loudly about the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty by the US. However, they do not view the defiance of Pakistani state and attacks on Pakistani targets by the TTP and other militant groups are also violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty.
The whole nation protested against the killing of 24 security personnel by US aircraft at the Salala border post in November 2011. A few days later, the Taliban released a video of execution of several Pakistani security personnel who had been kidnapped by them a couple of days earlier. There was hardly any protest on this. No leader or political and Islamic group of standing condemned the Taliban for these killings.
The Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) – a coalition of Islamic hard line and militant Islamic groups – is the major defender of the Taliban. Its position on Pakistan’s policies is similar to that of Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. They hold Pakistan’s pro-US policies as the sole cause of the Taliban violence against Pakistani state and its people.
These views on militancy and violence are shared by Imran Khan’s PTI and, in varying degrees, by the PML(N). Both accuse the federal government of pro-US policies and blame the government for failure to protect the lives of common people whenever there is some terrorist incident. There is hardly any criticism of the Taliban or other militant group engaged in violent activities. Interestingly enough, they appeal to government to stop security operations in the tribal areas. No such appeal is made to the TTP or other militant group to cease their violent activities.
The pro-Taliban sentiments in Pakistan are going to be reinforced by the latest Taliban attacks in different places in Afghanistan and the jail-break in Bannu. This practically means that Pakistan government will find it difficult to run its relations with the US on the basis of the recommendations agreed to in the resolution of the parliament. The DPC has already declared that it would not let any American goods pass through Pakistan. The DPC people have gained much confidence because no party or group contested their political discourse during the last five months. The groups and parties that otherwise detest the DPC would not in this case come forward to support the government for the revival of American supplies through Pakistan.
The DPC parties have no alternative but to assert them in the streets to sustain their momentum. A large number of groups in the DPC are not going to contest the elections as they do not have much electoral support. Therefore, street protest is the only option for most Islamic parties to demonstrate their political power. The playing up of anti-American sentiments sustains their support and it enables them to support the Taliban cause without publicly saying so.
Some of the demands made in the resolution are nothing more than a wish list. When these demands are not fulfilled, Islamic as well as other parties would criticise the government for what they would describe as the betrayal of the parliamentary resolution.
The federal government and the military want to pursue normal interaction with the US but they are not willing to say so in public. They have not so far owned the need of normal relations with the US especially the restoration of transit of American supplies through Pakistan. Not even once they tried to explain why the relationship is important for Pakistan and why do they think that these supplies should be allowed.
The only political discourse available in public is that of Islamists that is isolationist, i.e. ties with the West should be based only the terms given by ultra-nationalist and Islamist groups. Unless the military and the federal government muster courage to offer an alternative narrative and challenge the DPC type worldview, Pakistan will not be able to fulfil its obligations in the new relationship with the US.
Anti-Americanism encouraged by the military and conceded by the federal government in the post Salala incident helped to achieve the immediate agenda of diverting attention from non-response by the Pakistan military to violation of Pakistani sovereignty by the US. The long term implications of this strategy have become the major obstacles to the efforts of the Pakistan government and military to pursue normal interaction with the US.
Will ‘they’ let us?
The resolution passed by the joint session of the parliament on April 12 has offered new recommendations for pursuing Pakistan’s relations with the United States. In a week or so, Pakistan will start a dialogue with the US for reviving bilateral relations and resuming the supply of American goods through Pakistan for NATO/US troops based in Afghanistan.
It is not yet clear if the government of Pakistan will be able to deliver its part of the deal for transit of goods mainly because the security situation has changed a lot in and around Pakistan after the passage of the parliamentary resolution. Further, the resolution contains such demands that may not be implemented soon. The US is not expected to concede those demands quickly which will give the opposition parties in Pakistan another opportunity to question the government’s efforts to normalise relations with the US.
Two developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan on April 15 clearly show that the Taliban and its allies are gaining strength, making it difficult for Pakistan to pursue normal interaction with the US. The parliamentary resolution has been overshadowed by the April 15: attack on the prison in Bannu in KP and well-coordinated attacks in Kabul’s high security zone and other places in Afghanistan.
The massive nature of the Afghan Taliban assault show that the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Police, trained and equipped by the US. are unable to ensure security in Afghanistan. The growing power of Afghan Taliban is not a bad sign for Afghanistan’s stability which will have negative fallout on Pakistan’s tribal areas. The Pakistani Taliban (i.e. the TTP) have also demonstrated that despite their decline since 2009-2010 they retain enough capacity to challenge the Pakistani state. These Pakistani and Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani allied groups can threaten the transit route for American goods.
The parliamentary resolution does not say anything significant about Pakistan’s problems with Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups based in the tribal areas or mainland Pakistan. Almost all supporters of Islamic parties and militant groups as well as the activists of the PML(N) and PTI complain loudly about the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty by the US. However, they do not view the defiance of Pakistani state and attacks on Pakistani targets by the TTP and other militant groups are also violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty.
The whole nation protested against the killing of 24 security personnel by US aircraft at the Salala border post in November 2011. A few days later, the Taliban released a video of execution of several Pakistani security personnel who had been kidnapped by them a couple of days earlier. There was hardly any protest on this. No leader or political and Islamic group of standing condemned the Taliban for these killings.
The Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) – a coalition of Islamic hard line and militant Islamic groups – is the major defender of the Taliban. Its position on Pakistan’s policies is similar to that of Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. They hold Pakistan’s pro-US policies as the sole cause of the Taliban violence against Pakistani state and its people.
These views on militancy and violence are shared by Imran Khan’s PTI and, in varying degrees, by the PML(N). Both accuse the federal government of pro-US policies and blame the government for failure to protect the lives of common people whenever there is some terrorist incident. There is hardly any criticism of the Taliban or other militant group engaged in violent activities. Interestingly enough, they appeal to government to stop security operations in the tribal areas. No such appeal is made to the TTP or other militant group to cease their violent activities.
The pro-Taliban sentiments in Pakistan are going to be reinforced by the latest Taliban attacks in different places in Afghanistan and the jail-break in Bannu. This practically means that Pakistan government will find it difficult to run its relations with the US on the basis of the recommendations agreed to in the resolution of the parliament. The DPC has already declared that it would not let any American goods pass through Pakistan. The DPC people have gained much confidence because no party or group contested their political discourse during the last five months. The groups and parties that otherwise detest the DPC would not in this case come forward to support the government for the revival of American supplies through Pakistan.
The DPC parties have no alternative but to assert them in the streets to sustain their momentum. A large number of groups in the DPC are not going to contest the elections as they do not have much electoral support. Therefore, street protest is the only option for most Islamic parties to demonstrate their political power. The playing up of anti-American sentiments sustains their support and it enables them to support the Taliban cause without publicly saying so.
Some of the demands made in the resolution are nothing more than a wish list. When these demands are not fulfilled, Islamic as well as other parties would criticise the government for what they would describe as the betrayal of the parliamentary resolution.
The federal government and the military want to pursue normal interaction with the US but they are not willing to say so in public. They have not so far owned the need of normal relations with the US especially the restoration of transit of American supplies through Pakistan. Not even once they tried to explain why the relationship is important for Pakistan and why do they think that these supplies should be allowed.
The only political discourse available in public is that of Islamists that is isolationist, i.e. ties with the West should be based only the terms given by ultra-nationalist and Islamist groups. Unless the military and the federal government muster courage to offer an alternative narrative and challenge the DPC type worldview, Pakistan will not be able to fulfil its obligations in the new relationship with the US.
Anti-Americanism encouraged by the military and conceded by the federal government in the post Salala incident helped to achieve the immediate agenda of diverting attention from non-response by the Pakistan military to violation of Pakistani sovereignty by the US. The long term implications of this strategy have become the major obstacles to the efforts of the Pakistan government and military to pursue normal interaction with the US.
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